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ABSTRACT This article investigates mechanisms through which neuroti-
cism leads to distress in daily life. Neuroticism may lead to distress through
exposing people to a greater number of stressful events, through increasing
their reactivity to those events, or through a mechanism unrelated to envi-
ronmental events. This article evaluates the relative importance of these three
explanations. Subjects were 339 persons who provided daily reports of minor
stressful events and mood for 6 weeks. Exposure and reactivity to these minor
stressors explained over 40% of the distress difference between high- and low-
neuroticism subjects. Reactivity to stressors accounted for twice as much of
the distress difference as exposure to stressors. These results suggest that re-
actions within stressful situations are more important than situation selection
in explaining how neuroticism leads to distress in daily life.
Vv,.
Everyone has a unique quota of distress and ill-health. Some people are
habitually anxious or sad, whereas others are calm and happy. Some
people suffer many physical ailments, whereas others are rarely ill. It is
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now thought that these individual differences in health and well-being
are rooted, in part, in enduring personality characteristics (Friedman,
1990). Yet how personality is expressed in health and well-being re-
mains largely a mystery. In this article we test the hypothesis that it is
through stressful daily events that the effects of personality are revealed.
Specifically, we propose that personality can infiuence health and
psychological well-being in three ways. First, personality may explain
why some people get into stressful situations and others do not; an-
ticipating and preventing the occurrence of stressful events can be an
effective way of maintaining well-being. Second, personality may affect
how people react once they are in stressful situations; certain people
may habitually cope ineffectively under stress. Finally, personality may
lead to health and psychological outcomes through a mechanism unre-
lated to environmental events; personality may have an endogenous or
direct effect on well-being.
Stress researchers have traditionally conceptualized personality in
the second way—as a variable that modifies the impact of stressors on
health outcomes (see Cohen & Edwards, 1989, for a review of this lit-
erature). Studies of dispositions such as locus of control (Johnson &
Sarason, 1978; Parkes, 1984), hardiness (Kobassa, Maddi, & Kahn,
1982), self-consciousness (Mullen & Suls, 1982; Suls & Fletcher,
1985), and the Type A behavior pattern (Rhodewalt, Hays, Chemers,
& Wysocki, 1984; Suls, Gastorf, & Wittenberg, 1979) are examples
of research in this tradition. More recently, researchers have paid in-
creasing attention to how personality determines the types of situations
people encounter (Buss, 1984, 1987; Diener, Larsen, & Emmons, 1984;
Emmons, Diener, & Larsen, 1986; Snyder, 1983; Snyder & Ickes,
1985). For example. Smith and Rhodewah (1986) have argued that
Type A personalities are more prone to coronary heart disease because
they select stressful situations as well as overreact in them.
Despite the current attention to both exposure and reactivity to stres-
sors, the relative importance of these processes in linking personality
to well-being has not been established. Although people may select (or
be selected into) stressful situations, this process may be a relatively
minor contributor to individual differences in distress or illness. Simi-
larly, although personality modifies the relationship between stressors
and disorder, this process may play a relatively small role in explain-
ing individual differences in well-being. Finally, it is important to note
that the relationship between personality and health outcomes may be
Personality and Stress in Daily Life 357
largely unmediated by either exposure or reactivity to stressful events.
This issue has both practical and theoretical significance. Consider
intervention programs designed to reduce the health-damaging effects
of Type A behavior. Should these programs teach people to avoid
stressful situations, to cope more effectively with stressful situations,
or should they emphasize strategies that are not at all tied to stressful
situations (e.g., relaxation techniques)? Without knowing the relative
importance of exposure, reactivity, and unmediated processes in lead-
ing to the outcomes of personality, one cannot begin to address this
question.
This article investigates a specific disposition, neuroticism, and a
specific outcome, psychological distress. Of the primary dimensions of
personality, neuroticism is the chief determinant of psychological dis-
tress (Watson & Clark, 1984). We will assess the relative importance of
exposure to daily stressors, reactivity to those stressors, and a mecha-
nism unrelated to daily stressors in explaining the relation between
neuroticism and distress in daily life.
Neuroticism, Stressors, and Distress
What is the evidence that these three mechanisms—exposure, re-
activity, and unmediated processes—explain the link between neuroti-
cism and psychological distress? Evidence for the exposure mechanism
was reported in two recent studies. In a 6-year study of women with
school-aged children, neuroticism was a strong predictor of exposure to
major life events (Fergusson & Horwood, 1987). In the second study,
neuroticism predicted increased involvement in interpersonal conflicts
(Buss, Gomes, Higgins, & Lauterbach, 1987). Because these studies
rely on self-reports of stressors, however, it is unclear whether neuroti-
cism increases actual exposure to stressful events or merely reports of
stressful events. It has been demonstrated in laboratory studies that neu-
roticism increases the recall of negatively toned information (Lishman,
1972; Lloyd & Lishman, 1975; Martin, Ward, & Clark, 1983; Young
& Martin, 1981). If this recall bias operates in real-life situations, it
may account for some or all of the association between neuroticism and
exposure to stressors.
The evidence linking neuroticism to stressor reactivity is more clear-
cut. The state-trait theory of anxiety predicts that the effects of neuroti-
cism on anxiety will be most evident under stress (Endler & Edwards,
358 Bolger and Schilling
1982; H. J. Eysenck & M. W. Eysenck, 1985; Spielberger, Gorsuch, &
Lushene, 1970), and the theory has been verified in many studies (e.g.,
Bolger, 1990; Ormel, Stewart, & Sanderman, 1989).
The third putative rriechanism linking neuroticism to distress involves
neither exposure nor reactivity to stressful events. To the extent that
neuroticism is similar to negative affectivity—the disposition to experi-
ence negative affect even when provoking events are absent (Watson &
Clark, 1984)—the relationship between neuroticism and daily distress
should be unmediated by stressful events.
A Daily Diary Approach
We used a daily diary method to evaluate the relative importance of
exposure, reactivity, and unmediated explanations for the expression of
neuroticism in daily distress, tracking people as they moved through
many minor stressful situations. In that way we could gauge people's
exposure to stressors and their emotional reactions to the stressors. We
could then see whether neuroticism predicted individual differences in
exposure and reactivity and whether exposure and reactivity, in turn,
explained the relationship between neuroticism and daily distress.
The diary methodology also allowed us to study same-day and later-
day reactions to a stressor, enabling us to distinguish people's initial
emotional reactions to a stressor from their speed of recovery from
that stressor. This distinction may be critical to understanding the link
between neuroticism and distress. High- and low-neuroticism persons
may be equally upset by a stressful event on the day it occurs, but high-
neuroticism persons may remain distressed longer than low-neuroticism
persons, and consequently show higher average distress levels.
The data are from a 6-week study of daily stress in married couples.
Husbands and wives provided independent daily reports of their psycho-
logical distress and their experience of daily stressful events. Because
certain daily events were experienced by both husbands and wives
(e.g., marital arguments), we could test whether neuroticism affected
spouses' agreement that a stressful event occurred. As noted earlier,
the possibility that neuroticism biases stressor reports poses interpretive
problems. In this study, evidence of reporting bias could be gauged by
comparing husbands' and wives' reports of stressors.
We addressed the following questions. First, are persons high in neu-
roticism more distressed on average than persons low in neuroticism?
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Second, do persons high in neuroticism report greater exposure to daily
stressors than persons low in neuroticism, and, for events that spouses
share (e.g., marital arguments), do spouses agree that these events
actually occurred? Third, are persons high in neuroticism more emo-
tionally reactive—concurrently and over time—to the daily stressors
they experience? Fourth, what is the relative importance of exposure,
reactivity, and unmediated mechanisms in explaining why persons high
in neuroticism are more distressed than persons low in neuroticism?
METHOD
Sample
The sample cotnprised 339 persotis (166 married couples and 7 individuals)
who independently completed diaries every day for 42 consecutive days. All
respondents were married, were from the Detroit metropolitan area, and had
participated 1 year previously in a community survey of stress and coping.
Neuroticism was measured in this earlier survey. The response rate in the sur-
vey was 76%. Of the original eligible sample of couples, 34% participated
in the diary study. Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler, and Wethington (1989) com-
pared couples who participated in the diary study with those who did not on
a variety of background variables that were measured in the original survey
(including neuroticism). There was a small difference between the samples on
frequency of marital arguments: The diary sample tended to show less marital
conflict. (For more detailed information on data collection and response rates,
see Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler, and Schilling [1989].)
Measures
Neuroticism. In the original survey, each subject completed an 11-item short
form of the Neuroticism scale from the Eysenck Personality Inventory (H. J.
Eysenck & S. B. G. Eysenck, 1964). Examples of neuroticism items include:
Would you call yourself a nervous person? In general, are your feelings easily
hurt? Do you often feel fed-up? Are you a worrier? Cronbach's a for the scale
was .78. Although the Eysenck scale is a continuous variable, to simplify the
analysis, particularly the decomposition procedure (see statistical model), we
treated it as a dichotomous variable. We divided neuroticism at the median
such that 172 persons were classified high in neuroticism and 167 persons were
classified low in neuroticism.
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Daily stressors. The list of stressors in the daily diary was based on pilot work
that identified the most common daily events in a community sample of mar-
ried couples. The diary contained a checklist of the 22 most common events.
For analytic purposes we reduced this list to nine categories by combining
events that were both conceptually similar and had similar relationships to
daily distress. For example, we combined "spouse sick," "child sick," and "a
lot of demands made by your family" into a single "family demand" variable
(see Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler, & Schilling, 1989).
The nine stressor categories were {a) overload at home, {b) overload at work,
(c) family demand, {d) other demand, (e) transportation problem, (/) financial
problem, (g) argument with spouse, {h) argument with child, and (/) argument
with other (not spouse or child). We used dummy (0,1) variables to code the
occurrence of each stressor. For example, if a respondent had a financial prob-
lem on a particular day, the financial problem variable was coded 1 for that
person-day, and 0 otherwise. Because previous analyses revealed major differ-
ences in the emotional effects of different types of stressors (e.g., arguments
were more upsetting than overloads) (Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler, & Schilling,
1989), we kept each stressor category distinct in the present analyses.
Daily distress. Each day, respondents indicated how strongly they had felt each
of 18 emotions over the previous 24 hours. The emotion items were drawn
from the anxiety, depression, and hostility subscales of the Affects Balance
Scale (Derogatis, 1975). Anxiety was measured using items such as "nervous,"
"tense," and "afraid"; hostility using "irritable," "angry," and "resentful";
and depression using "helpless," "worthless," and "depressed." Respondents
rated each item on a 4-point scale from "not at all" to "a lot." Cronbach's a
was .92. We scaled the measure so that it ranged from 0 to 100, where 0 was
the lowest possible score and 100 was the highest possible score.
Statistical Model
Overview. The data analysis consisted of two major steps. First, we estimated
a model linking neuroticism, daily stressors, and daily distress. Then we used
the results of this model to decompose the neuroticism-distress relationship
into exposure to stressors, reactivity to stressors, and unmediated components.
Because the statistical model and the decomposition procedure are uncom-
mon, we discuss them in more statistical detail than is usual in a substantive
article. We also provide graphical descriptions of the model and the decom-
position procedure. Readers who wish to focus on the graphical descriptions
alone should skip forward to the section entitled "Graphical representation of
the hierarchical linear model."
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Hierarchical linear model linking neuroticism, daily stressors, and daily dis-
tress. We analyzed our data using a multilevel or hierarchical linear model
(Bryk & Raudenbush, 1987; Mason, Wong, & Entwisle, 1984; Strenio, Weis-
berg, «fe Bryk, 1983). The model allows us to obtain separate estimates of
stressor reactivity for each person and to express individual differences in
reactivity as a function of neuroticism.
Thus, our model specifies that each person in the population has his or her
own characteristic relationship between daily events and mood. For the sake
of simplicity, we begin our discussion with a model that includes only one
stressful event. It generalizes in a straightforward way to include more than
one stressful event. The model can be written as follows:
Di, = aoi -I- a],Si, + e,, (1)
where D,, is the distress of Person / on Day t, Si, indicates whether a stressor
occurred to Person / on Day t (coded 0 if no stressful event occurred, and 1
if a stressful event occurred), ao/ is the intercept for Person / (i.e.. Person Ts
distress on days when no stressful event occurred), aj, is Person i's slope or
reactivity to a stressful event (i.e., the number of units that Person i is higher
on distress on days when a stressful event occurred compared to days when
an event did not occur), and e,, is a random component of the distress of Per-
son I on Day t. The intercepts for each individual (ao,) and slopes for each
individual (ai;) are assumed to be drawn randomly from a population with
a normal distribution. Similarly, the random components of each individual's
daily distress score (e,,) are assumed to be drawn from a normal distribution
with a mean of 0 and to sbow no autocorrelation over time.'
We also specify that the coefficients of this model vary as a function of each
person's level of neuroticism, as follows:
1. Equation 1 specifies a time-series relationship between stressors and distress for
each person. It is not uncommon in time series models that temporally adjacent error
terms are positively correlated. Autocorrelation biases standard errors of parameter
estimates and thereby leads to biased statistical tests (see Caspi, Bolger, & Eckenrode,
1987, for a discussion of these issues as they relate to daily mood; see also Larsen &
Kasimatis, 1991, for a discussion of autocorrelation in daily physical symptoms). In
preliminary analyses we used the PROC AUTOREG program in SAS (SAS Institute,
1984) to estimate Equation 1 and to test for the presence of first-order autocorrelated
errors (first-order autocorrelation exists when immediately adjacent error terms (e,,
and ei, + [) are correlated). We ran this analysis separately for all 339 subjects in our
sample. We found only slight evidence of autocorrelation: Across all 339 subjects, the
average correlation between adjacent error terms was — .035.
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ao,- =bo + biNi + gi (2)
and
an =b2 + biNi + di (3)
Thus, Equations 2 and 3 show that Person ('s intercept and slope are func-
tions of an intercept, a neuroticism component (A', is coded 0 for low and 1
for high neuroticism), and a random component. The random components, gi
and di, are assumed to be drawn independently from normal distributions witb
mean 0.
Substituting for ao/ and a\i in Equation 1 we obtain a single-equation model
showing daily distress as a function of neuroticism and the daily stressful event:
Di, = {bo + b]Ni + gi) + {b2 + biNi + di)Si, + ei,
and therefore,
Di, =bo + biNi + biSi, + bjNS,, + gi + diSi, + ei, (4)^
Graphical representation of the hierarchical linear model. The hierarchical
model linking neuroticism, daily stressors, and daily distress is illustrated in
Figure 1. Note that Figure 1 is not based on empirical data; rather, it is a
device to convey the main elements of a hierarchical model. Figure 1 shows
that each individual has his or her own characteristic relationship (regression
line) between stressors and distress. It also shows that individuals fall into two
groups: the high-neuroticism group and the low-neuroticism group. There are
intercept differences between tbe groups: High-neuroticism persons tend, on
average, to be more distressed than low-neuroticism persons even wben no
stressful event occurs. There are also slope or reactivity differences between
the groups: High-neuroticism persons tend to become more upset than low-
neuroticism persons when stressful events occur. (Reactivity is defined as the
difference in a person's distress between days when a stressor occurs and days
when one does not.)
2. This model is more complex than those used in previous analyses of diary data. In
previous work it has been usual to assume that all persons in the analysis have a com-
mon slope, but that each person has his or her own regression intercept. The eifects of
these individual-specific intercepts have been taken into account either by residualizing
each person's data from his or her own mean (e.g., Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler, &
Schilling, 1989) or by including dummy variables for each person as predictor variables
(e.g., Cutrona. 1986). The present model allows each person to have his or her own
intercept and slope, and as such, is more sensitive to individual differences in daily
stress processes.




No Dally Stressor Dally Stressor
Figure 1
Hierarchical Linear Model of the Relationship between
Neuroticism, Daily Stiessors, and Daily Distress
The bold line for the high-neuroticism group shows the intercept and slope
for tbe average person in that group. The lighter lines represent deviations
from the group average. The line labeled "Person A" displays the model for
a high-neuroticism individual who is, on average, above the group mean on
distress on days when no stressful event occurs (i.e., has a high intercept) and
whose reactivity to stress is the same as the group average. The line labeled
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"Person D" displays the model for a low-neuroticism individual who is, on
average, less distressed than tbe group mean for "no stressor" days, and who
is slightly less reactive to stressors than the group is on average. Note, for
Persons A, B, C, and D, the distribution of points around their means for "no
stressor" and "stressor" days. These points are meant to represent the raw
data obtained in this study: reports of stressful events and mood for particular
individuals on particular days. The model uses eacb person's time-series data
on stressors and distress to obtain each person's intercept and reactivity to
stressors.
We can now begin to identify the specific terms in Equation 4 as they
are represented in Figure 1. (Readers interested in graphical accounts only
should now skip forward to the section entitled "Graphical illustration of tbe
decomposition procedure.") For the low-neuroticism group. A', equals zero,
and therefore the terms b\Ni and b^NSi, in Equation 4 equal zero. The model
therefore reduces to
Di, =bo + biSi, + gi + diSi, + e,, (5)
In Figure 1, the bold line for the low-neuroticism group represents the average
or expected value of D,, for days when no stressor occurs and for days when a
stressor occurs. The expected value of £>,,, conditional on 5,,, is
E{Di,/Si,) = E{bo + bjSi, -F g,- + diSi, + a,) = bo + bjSi, (6)
As shown in Figure 1, ^o is the group mean for days on wbich no stressful
event occurs and bi is the stressor reactivity, the number of units higher on dis-
tress tbat group members are on days when a stressful event occurs compared
to days when one does not occur.
For the higb-neuroticism group, Ni equals 1, and therefore tbe terms b\Ni
and bsNSi, in Equation 4 equal b\ and b^Si,, respectively. Therefore, tbe model
reduces to
Di, ={bo + bx) + {b2 + b3)Si, + gi + diSi, + ei, (7)
In the same manner as for the low-neuroticism group, the expected value of
this function, conditional on Si,, is
[bo + b^)-^{b2 + bi)Si, (8)
which is represented by the beavy line for the high-neuroticism group in
Figure 1. In this case, (&o + ^i) is the group mean on days when no stressful
event occurs and {b2 + ^3) is the group stress reactivity.
For botb the low- and high-neuroticism groups, the components gi, di, and
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ei, are the random parts of the model. Thus g, represents random variation
in intercepts due to specific persons in the low- and high-neuroticism groups.
Figure 1 shows that the value of g, for Person A is positive, giving that person
a higher-than-average distress score for days when no stressful event occurs,
wbereas the value of g, for Person B is negative, giving that person a lower-
than-average distress score for days when no stressful event occurs. The c/,
component represents random variation in stressor reactivity within the low-
and bigh-neuroticism groups; it captures how each person's reactivity differs
from the group average. For Person A the di component is zero, as this person
is at the higb-neuroticism group mean for stressor reactivity For Person C the
component is positive, as this person is more reactive to stress than the typical
person in tbe low-neuroticism group. The e,, component represents the ran-
dom fluctuation in a person's daily distress scores around his or her average:
Each e,, represents tbe deviation of a single data point around a person's mean
distress for either "no stressor" or "stressor" days.
The multiple-stressor case. The data set we analyzed contained not one but
nine stressful events. Thus for our purposes Equation 4 needs to be expanded
as follows:
Di, =bo + biNi - f 2 bjjSji, + 2 hjNSji, + g i + 2 djiSji, + ei, (9 )
j j J
Sjii (/• = 1,2,.. . ,9) represents nine dummy (0,1) variables that indicate
whether Respondent / experienced Stressorj on Day /. NSji, (/ = 1,2, . . . , 9)
represents nine interaction terms between Stressor j and the neuroticism
dummy (0,1) variable. These interaction terms are also dummy variables and
their coefficients b^j indicate the mean difference in reactivity to Stressor j
between respondents in the high-neuroticism group and those in the low-
neuroticism group.
We showed earlier that our single-stressor model. Equation 4, could be writ-
ten as two submodels: Equation 5, showing the determinants of distress for
tbe low-neuroticism group, and Equation 7, showing these determinants for
the high-neuroticism group. Using Equations 5 and 7, we then showed that tbe
average or expected value of distress for the low- and high-neuroticism groups
for no-stress and stress days was given by Equations 6 and 8, respectively. In
the same manner, using the multiple-stressor Equation 9 as our starting point,
we can sbow tbe expected value of distress for the low-neuroticism group!
conditional on Sji,, is
(10)
J
The reactivity of a low-neuroticism respondent to Stressor 7 is thus 1
'2;-
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Similarly, the expected value of the high-neuroticism submodel is
{bo + b^) + Y(h + by)Sji, (11)
The reactivity of a high-neuroticism respondent to Stressor / is, therefore,
^2/ + by, and the difference in reactivities between low- and high-neuroticism
groups is by.
Because our data were longitudinal, we could investigate the tendency for
stressors to affect distress beyond the day of their occurrence. We could also
examine whether this process depended on level of neuroticism. To do this we
used the following equation:
Di, =bo + bsNi + 2 hjSji, +
j j
+ 1 b4jPji, + 2 h^Pj
j j j
+ ifjiPji, + ei, (12)
j
The nine dummy variables (F,,,) indicate whether Respondent (' experienced
Stressory on the day prior to Day t. Interactions of these variables with the neu-
roticism group dummy variable yield nine additional dummy variables {NPjn).
The coefficients of these interaction variables, by, estimate neuroticism-related
differences in the tendency for yesterday's stressors to affect today's distress.
The term fjiPji, represents the individual random components of the prior-day
stressor effects.
Decomposing the effect of neuroticism on distress. Using information from tbe
models above, we can compare the relative importance of exposure to stres-
sors, reactivity to stressors, and unmediated processes in explaining the overall
mean difference in distress between the two neuroticism groups. The following
is an algebraic description of the technique. More complete expositions of the
decomposition technique can be found in Winsborough and Dickinson (1971),
Kessler (1979), or lams and Thornton (1975). Readers who would rather skip
the algebra and rely on a graphical description should turn to the next section
of tbe article.
To simplify the algebra, we will assume tbat stressors only bave a concurrent
(same-day) effect on distress, i.e., that the quantities ^4,, bsj, and^, in Equa-
tion 12 are zero. The method we will describe, however, can be generalized to
include both concurrent and cross-day reactivity effects.
It is a characteristic of linear regression that if the means of all predictor
variables are substituted into tbe regression equation, the predicted value of
the dependent variable will be its mean (see Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner,
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1985, pp. 43-46). Therefore, by computing the relevant means—over persons
and days—for each stressor, and by substituting these means (probabilities of
exposure to each stressor) into Equations 10 and 11, we can predict the mean
level of distress for the low- and higb-neuroticism groups, respectively. The
mean level of distress for the low-neuroticism group {ML) can be written as
ML = bo+ 2 b2jSLj =bo + 2 bLjSLj (13)
j j
Similarly, the mean level of distress for the higb-neuroticism group (A///) can
be written as
SHi (14)
Here SLJ and SHJ give tbe probabilities of exposure to Stressory for the low- (L)
and high- {H) neuroticism groups. Similarly, bLj and buj index how reactive
the low- and high-neuroticism groups are to Stressor j . Using Equations 13
and 14, we can sbow that the difference in distress between the two groups,
assuming, for simplicity, only one stressor (i.e., dropping tbej subscript), is
ML-Mn = bo- {bo + bx) +
By adding {—bLSn + bLSfj), wbich is equal to zero, to the rigbt-band side of
tbe equation and collecting terms this becomes
Expanding bL in the second term to {bL - bH + bn), this becomes
This can tben be rewritten as
- SH)
Including all nine stressors as predictors and rearranging terms, tbe equation is:
(15)
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The quantity ML — MH can be viewed as the decrease in distress that is
required to make the high-neuroticism group's distress equal tbat of the low-
neuroticism group. We can see from Equation 15 that this mean difference
can be decomposed into four components. The first term is what we referred
to earlier as the exposure component of the mean difference in distress. This
term estimates the decrease in the mean distress level of the high-neuroticism
group if this group's reactivity level were held constant but its exposure to all
stressors were made to equal that of the low-neuroticism group. The second
term is the reactivity component. This estimates the decrease in the mean dis-
tress level of the high-neuroticism group if this group's exposure to stressors
were held constant but its reactivity to all stressors were made equal to that of
the low-neuroticism group.
The third term is the interaction component. This is the effect of simulta-
neously changing the neuroticism group's exposure and reactivity to stressors,
over and above the effect of changing each alone. If this term is relatively large,
then the effect of changing both exposure and reactivity may be much smaller
or much greater than the sum of the effects of changing exposure alone and
changing reactivity alone (see lams & Thornton, 1975).
The final term is the unmediated or residual component, the component of
the distress difference not attributable to exposure, reactivity, or interaction. It
can also be interpreted as the difference in distress that would exist between
the high- and low-neuroticism groups in the absence of any stressful events,
i.e., the difference in the regression intercepts of each group.
Graphical illustration of the decomposition procedure. Figure 2 provides a
graphical illustration of the procedure used to decompose the neuroticism-
distress relationship. To simplify the exposition, we again assume tbat distress
is predicted by only one stressful event. Note also tbat Figure 2 is not based
on empirical data; it is intended as an aid to understanding the decomposition
procedure. Figure 2, Panel A, shows the relationship between experiencing
a stressful event and becoming distressed for the high- and low-neuroticism
groups. Figure 2 is, in fact, a simplified version of Figure 1, in which we
display only tbe regression lines for the average low- and bigh-neuroticism indi-
vidual. Unlike Figure 1, however, we have also indicated the mean exposure
to stressors and tbe mean distress levels for both groups.
There are three noteworthy features of Figure 2, Panel A. Notice that higb-
neuroticism individuals are more distressed on average than low-neuroticism
individuals. Notice also that they have higher exposure and higher reactivity
to stressors tban the low-neuroticism individuals. Finally, notice that for both
the low- and bigh-neuroticism groups, the mean exposure to stressors predicts
the mean distress for that group. Tbus, for the low-neuroticism regression line,
notice that the low-neuroticism mean exposure to stressors predicts tbe low-
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neuroticism mean on distress. Similarly, for the high-neuroticism regression
line, notice that tbe high-neuroticism mean exposure to stressors predicts the
high-neuroticism mean on distress.
Panels B, C, and D, respectively, show the unmediated, exposure, and
reactivity components of the mean difference in distress. (The interaction com-
ponent, described in the previous section, is not displayed because in the
empirical data we will present later this was small enough to be ignored.) We
turn first to the unmediated component (Panel B). We referred to this earlier as
the difference in distress that would bave existed in the absence of any stress-
ful event. This effect is captured by the difference in intercepts between the
low- and high-neuroticism groups (the intercept is the level of distress for days
wben no stressful event occurs). Panel B shows that by lowering the intercept
of the high group to equal that of the low group, tbe overall mean difference in
distress between tbe groups would decrease.
Panel C shows the exposure effect, i.e., the effect of lowering the higb-
neuroticism group's exposure to stressors to the level of the low-neuroticism
group, while keeping their reactivity constant. To see this, attend only to the
high group's regression line. Notice that if (on the x-axis) we lower tbe expo-
sure of tbe higb group to that of the low group, we observe (on the y-axis) a
corresponding decrease in the high group's distress.
Panel D shows the reactivity effect, i.e., the effect of holding the higb-
neuroticism group's exposure to stress constant but lowering its reactivity to
stressors to that of the low-neuroticism group. To see this, look first at the point
on the bigh-neuroticism group's regression line corresponding to its mean ex-
posure to stressors. Now, observe the effect of dropping down perpendicularly
to tbe low group's regression line (i.e., lowering reactivity while holding ex-
posure constant). Once again there is a decrease in the mean difference in
distress.
RESULTS
Neuroticism and Daily Distress
On average, high-neuroticism subjects were more distressed than low-
neuroticism subjects over the 6-week daily diary period. We determined
this by first calculating the mean distress across all days separately for
each subject and then expressing these means as a function of neuroti-
cism and gender in a 2 x 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA). Using tbe
ANOVA model we calculated the mean difference in distress for low-
and high-neuroticism persons, adjusting for gender and the Gender x
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wives were matched in the sample.' There was a 5.8 unit difference in
distress between the high- and low-neuroticism groups, f (335) = 4.70,
p < .0001. This corresponds to 8% of the between-person variance
in daily distress, which is equivalent to a partial correlation of .28 or
a standardized effect size of .59 (see Cohen, 1988, p. 20). We were
interested in explaining this 5.8 unit difference in distress in terms of
differences in exposure and reactivity to daily stressors.
Neuroticism and Exposure to Stiessois
Figure 3 shows the mean exposure to each stressful event by level of
neuroticism. These means were obtained by first calculating the mean
exposure to stress for each person (expressed as the percentage of days
over the 6-week period on which each event occurred) and then, as
before, using an ANOVA model to average these means by level of
neuroticism, adjusting for gender of respondent and the Gender x
Neuroticism interaction. Because each stressor was coded as a dummy
(0,1) variable, each person's stressor exposure (e.g., to arguments with
child) is simply the arithmetic mean of his or her scores for that stressor
across the 6-week period (this was then multiplied by 100 to obtain a
percentage score).
Figure 3 is noteworthy in several respects. First, high-neuroticism
respondents are, in general, more exposed to stressors than low-neuroti-
cism respondents. In seven of the nine stressor categories, high-neuroti-
cism respondents are more likely than low-neuroticism respondents to
report a stressful event, although only two of these seven differences (for
argument with spouse and argument with other) were statistically sig-
nificant at F( l , 335), /7 < .05, two-tailed. Second, interpersonal con-
flicts are consistently more prevalent for high-neuroticism respondents.
The difference in mean stressor exposure is 1.8% of days for argument
with spouse, 1.9% for argument with child, and 3.3% for argument
with other.
We noted in the introduction that high-neuroticism subjects might
have a lower threshold than low-neuroticism subjects for reporting
stressful events. For example, a person high in neuroticism might re-
port a minor disagreement as an argument, whereas a person low in
3. We used the SAS PROC GLM program to do these calculations (SAS Insti-
tute, 1985).
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Figure 3
Neuroticism and Exposure to Daily Stressors
Note. Low N = low neuroticism; High N = high neuroticism.
**p < .05, two-tailed.
neuroticism would consider the same event too insignificant to report.
We checked for this possibility by analyzing respondents' and spouses'
reports of marital arguments and found no evidence for it. Specifically,
we performed a 4 x 2 x 42 repeated measures analysis of variance
(MANOVA) with Neuroticism (husband-low, wife-low; husband-low,
wife-high; husband-high, wife-low; and husband-high, wife-high) as
a between-couple factor, and with Gender (husband, wife) and Time
(Day 1 through Day 42) as repeated-measurement factors. Although
we found that wives were more likely in general to report a marital
argument on a particular day than husbands (6.5% of days vs. 5.4%
of days), the discrepancy between husbands and wives did not differ as
a function of neuroticism. Therefore, compared to low-neuroticism re-
spondents, high-neuroticism respondents do not appear to have a lower
threshold for reporting marital arguments.
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Neuioticism and Reactivity to Daily Stressors
Note. Low N = low neuroticism; High N = high neuroticism.
*p < .1 , two-tailed.
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Neuroticism and Reactivity to Stiessois
Figure 4 shows differences in stressor reactivity between the low- and
high-neuroticism groups for each of the nine stressors. Recall that we
defined reactivity as the difference in a person's distress on days when
a stressor occurs compared to days when it does not. As in the case
of stressor exposure, we first obtained estimates of stressor reactivity
for each person (see Equation 1) and then expressed these estimates
as a function of neuroticism (see Equation 3), adjusting for gender of
respondent and the Gender x Neuroticism interaction."
Figure 4 shows that both low- and high-neuroticism respondents ex-
perience greater distress on days when stressors occur than on days
when they do not. Across the set of nine stressors, however, high-
neuroticism respondents experience more event-related distress than
4. We used the SAS PROC REG program (SAS Institute, 1985) to obtain individual
estimates of reactivity and used the SAS PROC GLM program to express these as a
function of neuroticism and to adjust for gender.
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do low-neuroticism respondents, Wilks's Lambda = .94, F(9,327) =
2.21, p < .03. In univariate tests, the significance level for the neuroti-
cism effects was at least/? < .1 , two-tailed, F(l , 335), for four events:
overloads at home, overloads at work, arguments with spouse, and
arguments with other persons. As shown in Figure 4, when these events
occurred, high-neuroticism respondents became more distressed than
low-neuroticism respondents by 1.7, 2.0, 3.3, and 4.8 units, respec-
tively.
We also tested whether high- and low-neuroticism respondents dif-
fer in the speed with which they recover emotionally from stressful
events. To do this, we looked at differences in reactivity between high-
and low-neuroticism respondents on the day following a stressful event,
controlling for whether or not a stressful event also occurred on this
day. A global test of the significance Qf the difference in reactivity, in
terms of the nine 65 coefficients in Equation 12, was not significant,
Wilks's Lambda = .98, F(9,327) = 0i77, ns.
Neuioticism and Daily l{>istiess: Ezposuie,
Reactivity, and Residual Explanations
Decomposition of neuroticism-distress relationship. We have seen that
persons high in neuroticism are more lpkely than those low in neuroti-
cism to experience stressful situations ai|>d to become distressed by those
situations. Recall that the mean differet̂ ce in distress between low- and
high-neuroticism respondents was 5.8i units and that using Equation
15, this difference can be decomposed ihto four components: exposure,
reactivity, interaction, and unmediated.
Substituting the exposure and reactivity estimates from Figures 3
and 4 into Equation 15, we calculated the exposure, reactivity, inter-
action, and unmediated components. The exposure component is .8
units, indicating that high-neuroticism irespondents would experience
a mean level of distress .8 units lower if we held their reactivity to
all stressors constant, yet lowered their exposure to those stressors to
the level experienced by low-neuroticism respondents. The reactivity
component is 1.7 units, indicating that high-neuroticism respondents
would experience a mean level of distress 1.7 units lower if we held
their exposure to all stressors constant but lowered their reactivity to
those stressors to the level of low-neuroticism respondents. Note that
this component is twice as large as the exposure component.
The interaction component is only -0.1 units, too small to affect
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our conclusions about exposure and reactivity to daily stressors. Expo-
sure and reactivity to environmental stressors account for [.8 -I- 1.7-H
( -0 . l)]/5.8 = 41% of the overall mean difference in distress; thus,
59% of the mean difference in distress is not attributable to environ-
mental events.'
Contribution of particular stressors to the neuroticism-distress relation-
ship. Not all events contributed equally to explaining the neuroticism-
distress relationship. We noted earlier that high-neuroticism respondents
were consistently more reactive than low-neuroticism respondents to
overloads at home and at work. In addition, high-neuroticism respon-
dents were more exposed and more reactive to adult interpersonal con-
fiicts, namely, arguments with spouse and with others. These interper-
sonal confiicts are the most important daily stressors in explaining the
neuroticism-distress relationship. The two types of conflict account for
1.19 units or 50% of what we were able to explain of the neuroticism-
distress relationship. The two overloads account for .95 units or 40%
of the explained portion of the neuroticism-distress relationship.
Results Using Between-Person Estimates of
Stiess-Reactivity
In this study we used time-series data to calculate within-person esti-
mates of reactivity to stressors. It is instructive to briefly compare
the results obtained using the within-person approach with the results
that would have been obtained had we adopted the more conventional
between-person approach. Reactivity is defined as the difference in
distress associated with a unit change in exposure to stressors. Between-
person estimates of reactivity are obtained by regressing individual
differences in distress on individual differences in exposure to stres-
sors. Between-person estimates of effects need not be similar to within-
5. In response to a reviewer's query, we examined the extent to which the neuroticism-
distress relationship found in this study could be attributed to the overlap between
neuroticism and self-esteem. We reran all analyses controlling for self-esteem (mea-
sured by the Rosenberg scale). Controlling for dichotomized self-esteem, the original
neuroticism effect on mean daily distress was reduced from 5.8 units to 5.4 units. In
addition, our estimates of exposure and reactivity effects were virtually unchanged.
This suggests that the neuroticism-related exposure and reactivity processes identified
in this study are independent of self-esteem.
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person estimates. In the present study, we found that the effects of daily
stressors and their interactions with neuroticism explained 26% of the
within-person variance in distress, whereas these variables explained
41% of the between-person variance in distress.
Predictably then, when between-person estimates of reactivity are
substituted into the distress-decomposition equation (Equation 15), we
explain a greater proportion of the mean difference in distress. Instead
of explaining 41% of the neuroticism effect, we now explain 72% of
the effect. The decomposition is as follows: 5.8 (total effect) = 2.2 (ex-
posure) -1-3.0 (reactivity) - 1.0 (interaction) -1-1.6 (residual). In this
decomposition, reactivity and exposure effects are relatively similar in
size. P'urthermore, daily stressors largely account for why neuroticism
is associated with distress in daily life: The residual portion is only 28%
of the effect (compared with 59% in the previous decomposition). Note
that the difference between the two decompositions is due purely to
differences in estimates of reactivity: The values for mean distress and
mean exposure to stress used in the two decompositions are identical.
DISCUSSION
This study has five main findings: {a) We have shown that reactivity
to stressors is twice as important as exposure to stressors in explaining
the relationship between neuroticism and distress in daily life, {b) Inter-
personal conflicts with other adults are the most important types of
daily stressors in explaining this relationship, (c) High-neuroticism re-
spondents are no more likely than low-neuroticism respondents to show
emotional reactivity on days following a stressful event; thus speed-of-
recovery differences do not explain the neuroticism-distress relation-
ship, {d) Fifty-nine percent of the neuroticism-distress relationship is
not mediated by either exposure or reactivity to stressors. (e) Using a
within-subject approach to assess stress reactivity leads to conclusions
very different from those that would be obtained using a more con-
ventional between-subjects approach. We discuss each of these findings
in turn.
Exposure versus Reactivity
In recent years, considerable attention has been paid to the importance
of situation selection in determining the outcomes of personality. In this
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article we captured this situation selection process in terms of exposure
to common daily stressors. We do not wish to imply, however, that all
of the stressors the subjects reported in this study were self-selected.
People are often exposed to stressors for reasons beyond their control.
Yet despite using a liberal definition of selection as exposure to stres-
sors, we found that stressor reactivity was twice as important as stressor
exposure in explaining the neuroticism-distress relationship.
Because we did not obtain detailed information on the context in
which subjects were exposed to daily stressors, we cannot disentangle
the various processes that might underlie the exposure effect. For ex-
ample, we have not distinguished between chosen and imposed situa-
tions in the present study, and it is known that personality is a stronger
predictor of exposure to chosen situations than to imposed situations
(Emmons et al., 1986). The effect of neuroticism on stress exposure
that we find, then, is a result of averaging across chosen and imposed
situations. More fine-grained research on this topic is clearly necessary.
How do neuroticism-based differences in reactivity come about? We
think they arise primarily through what people do within stressful situa-
tions, specifically, through high-neuroticism subjects' use of less effec-
tive coping mechanisms when confronted with stress. In a longitudinal
study, Bolger (1990) has shown that neuroticism predicts emotional re-
activity to a major examination, and that this reactivity can be explained
as the result of ineffective coping efforts, i.e., wishful thinking and
self-blame .*̂
Inteipeisonal Conflicts and the
Neuroticism-Distress Relationship
We found that just two of the nine stressors—conflicts and tensions
with spouse and with other adults—accounted for half of the explained
6. Not all studies have found self-blame to be an ineffective coping mechanism. Sev-
eral cross-sectional studies (Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Tennen, Affleck, & Gersh-
man, 1986; Timko & Janoff-Bulman, 1985) have shown that self-blame is associated
with lower distress.
7. McCrae and Costa (1986) have also linked neuroticism to ineffective coping with
stress, although they argue that coping does not mediate the effects of neuroticism and
distress (see Bolger, 1990, for a discussion of this issue). More generally, research on
personality and adaptation to stress has increasingly emphasized the mediating effects
of coping efforts (see, for example, research on optimism by Scheier, Weintraub, &
Carver [1986] and locus of control [Parkes, 1984]).
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portion of the neuroticism-distress relationship. Although not generally
considered to be a defining feature of neuroticism, interpersonal con-
flict appears to be one of the key mechanisms linking this disposition to
distress in daily life. As such, these results are consistent with those of
Buss et al. (1987), who found that among married couples neuroticism
predicts the use of conflictual tactics of manipulation.
More generally, it is becoming clear that conflicts and tensions with
others are the pi'incipal sources of daily stress. In a previous article,
Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler, and Schilling (1989) found that interper-
sonal conflicts were by far the most important stressors in terms of their
effects on daily distress. As in the case of daily stress studies in gen-
eral, future studies on the effects of neuroticism should pay particular
attention to interpersonal conflicts as mediators.
Neuroticism and Speed of Recovery
from Daily Stressors
It seemed plausible to us at the outset that some of the aggregate
relationship between neuroticism and distress might be because persons
high in neuroticism take longer than those low in neuroticism to recover
from daily stressors. Previous research has shown that factors such as
social support and level of chronic stress affect recovery speed, such that
those with the least support and with the greatest levels of chronic stress
show subsequent-day effects of daily stressors (Caspi et al., 1987).
Analogously, we thought that high-neuroticism individuals might have
a slower recovery speed than low-neuroticism individuals. However, we
found no tendency for high-neuroticism individuals to remain relatively
more distressed on days following an event.
It is important to note that these results do not mle out the possibility
that neuroticism affects recovery speed within days. Thus persons low
in neuroticism might show no aftereffects of marital arguments within
several hours following the event, whereas persons high in neuroticism
might remain distressed for the rest of the day. Because we obtained
only one measurement each day we were unable to test this possibility.*
8. Note, however, that despite using three repeated measurements per day, Larsen
and Kasimatis (1991) found no relationship between neuroticism and the duration of
physical symptoms.
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Unmediated Portion of the Neuroticism-Distiess
Relationship
Almost 60% of the neuroticism-distress relationship is not mediated by
daily stressful experiences. This finding partially supports Watson and
Clark's (1984) view that neuroticism—or negative affectivity—is the
disposition to experience distress even in the absence of environmental
stressors. To the extent that we have not adequately measured common
daily events, of course, the size of this component will be overesti-
mated. Nonetheless, it appears that a substantial portion of the daily
distress associated with neuroticism is not explained by daily variation
in minor, negative events.
Although the focus of this study was on minor stressors, we can also
rule out major life events as possible mediators of the residual portion
of the neuroticism-distress relationship. Fewer than half of 1% of the
person-days in the study involved any major life events (e.g., becoming
unemployed; see Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler, & Schilling, 1989). Thus,
major events were sufficiently rare that it is unlikely they contributed to
explaining the neuroticism-distress relationship.
Between-Person versus Within-Person Results
We found that by assessing stressor reactivity in a between-person fash-
ion we were able to explain 72% of the neuroticism-distress relation-
ship. This compares favorably with our ability to explain 41% of the
relationship using within-person estimates of reactivity. The between-
person results lead to substantive interpretations very different from
those of the within-person results. The between-person results imply
that daily stressors largely explain why neuroticism and distress are
related, whereas the within-person results imply that the majority
of the neuroticism-distress relationship is unexplained by daily stres-
sors. Furthermore, the between-person results imply that exposure
and reactivity processes are of comparable importance in explaining
the neuroticism-distress relationship, whereas the within-person re-
sults imply that reactivity is distinctly more important than exposure in
explaining the relationship.
We believe that the within-person results are more accurate than
the between-person results. Unlike between-person estimates, within-
person estimates of stress reactivity cannot be influenced by omitted
between-person variables. We suspect that the between-person results
Personality and Stress in Daily Life 381
are inflated and distorted because of omitted between-person factors
(such as poor living conditions) that are correlated both with individual
differences in stressor exposure and with individual differences in dis-
tress.'
In general, this problem is equivalent to the "ecological fallacy" of
assuming that correlations between variables defined at aggregate levels
such as states or countries (e.g., between unemployment and crime
rates) give us accurate estimates of correlations at the individual level
(between being unemployed and committing a crime; see Langbein &
Lichtman, 1978). In the same way, it is unwise to assume that cor-
relations between variables defined at the between-person level may
give us accurate estimates of correlations between the same variables
if they were measured within persons over time. Yet often there is the
temptation to draw conclusions about within-person relationships even
when data are measured at the between-person level only. Although not
necessarily true in general, it is significant that ecological correlations
are often higher than their equivalents at the individual level, just as
we observed that between-person estimates of stressor reactivity were
substantially higher than their equivalents at the within-person level.
Limitations of the Study
Inferences from this study are limited in several ways. First, we have
studied people at a time of relative equilibrium, i.e., during a typical
6-week period. As noted earlier, fewer than half of 1% of the person-
days in our study involved any major life events. To adequately explore
exposure and reactivity to major life events, it would be necessary to
study people over longer periods of time or to design studies around
major life transitions. Therefore we cannot assume that the relative
importance of exposure versus reactivity for the neuroticism-distress
relationship will be the same for major events as it is for minor events.
It is also worth noting that the types of daily stressors people com-
monly experience may be constrained by such prior life events and
9. Although the within-person estimates of stressor reactivity are smaller than equiva-
lent between-person estimates of reactivity, they are still substantial. As such they
further illustrate that daily stressful events have potent effects on well-being even when
one controls for individual difference variables such as neuroticism. For an excellent
discussion of this and related issues see Lazarus (1990) and associated peer commen-
taries.
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transitions. For example, a person may be in a chronically unpleasant,
unrewarding job because prior economic conditions led to the loss of
a pleasant, rewarding job. Ideally, then, one would like to understand
the selection processes that led people into the equilibrium conditions
in which we found them.
A second limitation arises from our use of a crude, checklist approach
to measure daily events. It is possible that the stressor reactivity effects
we found may be due, in part, to stressor heterogeneity. Although our
analyses controlled for the effects of between-event heterogeneity (i.e.,
arguments with children are less severe than arguments with adults),
we could not control for unmeasured within-event heterogeneity (e.g.,
some arguments with spouse may be more severe than others). Accord-
ingly, it may be that neuroticism appears to influence stressor reactivity,
in part, because it influences exposure to objectively more severe ver-
sions of the same event. In future research, one way to circumvent this
problem would be to obtain detailed accounts of each stressful event
and to use independent raters to code these events for severity. An ex-
ample of such an approach is the system developed by Brown and
his colleagues for the study of major life events (see Brown & Har-
ris, 1978).
A final limitation concems the adequacy of our list of daily stressors.
Although we attempted to create a diary instrument that captured the
most common daily stressors, we may have missed important categories
of events—for example, neglect and inattentiveness in interpersonal
relationships. Significantly, this type of "cold treatment" is character-
istic of those high on neuroticism (Buss et al., 1987), and it is pos-
sible that such behavior evokes similar responses from the spouses of
high-neuroticism individuals. If so, we may have missed important me-
diators of the neuroticism effect, and the unmediated portion of the
neuroticism-distress relationship may be smaller than it appears to be
in this study.
CONCLUSION
Recent attempts to understand the relationship of personality to health
and psychological outcomes have focused on situation-selection pro-
cesses. Available evidence suggests that selection processes are impor-
tant and statistically reliable phenomena. To date, however, no research
has attempted to compare the importance of situation selection with
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situation reactivity in determining the outcomes of personality. Using a
naturalistic design, we examined this issue as it concerned the relation-
ship between neuroticism and distress in daily life. For this personality-
outcome relationship, we found that selection processes—as indexed
by exposure to daily stressors—were, at best, half as important as
reactivity processes.
Whether this pattern of results holds for other personality measures
and for other health and psychological outcomes is presently unclear.
Future studies need to address this issue. To this end, the design and
methodology used here can readily be applied to other personality-
outcome relationships. For the neuroticism-distress relationship, how-
ever, it appears that our psychological well-being is shaped more by
how we react within stressful situations than by our exposure to those
situations.
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